Did Improvements in Household Technology Cause the Baby Boom? Evidence from Electrification, Appliance Diffusion, and the Amish by Martha J. Bailey & William J. Collins
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
DID IMPROVEMENTS IN HOUSEHOLD TECHNOLOGY CAUSE THE BABY






NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
January 2009 Bailey is an Assistant Professor of Economics and a Faculty Affiliate at the Population Studies and
National Poverty Centers at the University of Michigan, and a Faculty Research Fellow at the National
Bureau of Economic Research. Collins is a Professor of Economics at Vanderbilt University and a
Research Associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. We are grateful to Soren Anderson,
John Bound, Alison Buttenheim, Charlie Brown, John DiNardo, Robert Driskill, Richard Easterlin,
Daniel Eisenberg, Robert Gordon, Chris House, Karen Johnson-Weiner, Miles Kimball, David Lam,
Robert Margo, Elyce Rotella, Katharine Shester, Matthew Shapiro, Jeff Smith, and Gary Solon for
useful comments and suggestions. We also thank participants in seminars at Clemson University, the
CSWEP Junior Faculty Mentoring Workshop, the Economic History Association Meetings, Lehigh
University, McGill University, the National Bureau of Economic Research, the Population Association
of America’s Meetings, Queen’s University, the University of Michigan (Economic History, Macroeconomics,
and Population Studies), University of North Carolina-Greensboro, and the University of Toronto.
Emily Boleman, Emily Gray, and Brad Hershbein provided outstanding research assistance. We gratefully
acknowledge financial support from the National Science Foundation and the Robert Wood Johnson
Foundation and helpful comments from Ananth Seshadri and Guillaume Vandenbroucke. The views
expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National
Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2009 by Martha J. Bailey and William J. Collins. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not
to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including
© notice, is given to the source.Did Improvements in Household Technology Cause the Baby Boom? Evidence from Electrification,
Appliance Diffusion, and the Amish
Martha J. Bailey and William J. Collins
NBER Working Paper No. 14641
January 2009, Revised June 2010
JEL No. E0,J1,N3
ABSTRACT
More than a half century after its peak, the baby boom’s causes remain a puzzle. A new argument
posits that rapid advancements in household technology from 1940 to 1960 account for this large increase
in fertility. We present new empirical evidence that is inconsistent with this claim. Rapid advances
in household technology began long before 1940 while fertility declined; differences and changes
in appliance ownership and electrification in U.S. counties are negatively correlated with fertility rates
from 1940 to 1960; and the correlation between children ever born (measured at ages 41 to 60) and
access to electrical service in early adulthood is negative for the relevant cohorts of women. Moreover,
the Amish, a group strictly limiting the use of modern household technologies, experienced a sizable
and coincident baby boom. A final section reconciles this evidence with economic theory by allowing


















  After at least 100 years of secular decline, births per 1,000 women (ages 15 to 44) in the 
United States increased by more than 50 percent between 1939 and 1957 (see figure 1).  This 
remarkable departure from longer-term trends, often called the “baby boom,” was not a short-lived, 
statistical aberration reflecting postponed births from the Depression or World War II.  Rather, it 
stretched over two decades and was driven by earlier marriage and childbearing, shorter birth 
intervals, and increases in completed childbearing (Ryder 1980, Rogers and O’Connell 1984).
1  
These features of the American baby boom present a fascinating challenge to scholars, especially 
because the rise in fertility took place against a backdrop of increasing income, urbanization, 
educational attainment, and women’s labor force participation—all trends typically associated with 
declining fertility.     
  For over forty years, two main schools of thought in economics have shaped scholarship on 
the baby boom.  One cornerstone of the literature has been Richard Easterlin’s “relative income 
hypothesis” (1961, 1980), which emphasizes the difference between a cohort’s “earnings potential” 
relative to its “material aspirations.”  In this view, children who grew up in the Depression and World 
War II formed modest material aspirations that were far surpassed by their actual experience as 
young adults in the 1940s and 1950s.  They responded by marrying younger and having more 
children.  Another cornerstone has been Gary Becker’s neoclassical theory of fertility (1960, 1965, 
with Gregg Lewis 1973).  Contrary to Easterlin’s emphasis on preference formation, the neoclassical 
viewpoint emphasizes changes in relative prices and incomes.  Robert Barro and Becker (1988) 
reformulated this static framework to allow altruistic parents to incorporate their children’s utility 
within an inter-generational, dynastic framework.  Their paper argues that a temporary increase in 
child-rearing costs during the Great Depression and World War II depressed fertility and that the 
postwar baby boom made up for these foregone births (1988: 15).
2  Although the Easterlin and 
Becker schools of thought have moved closer together with time (Sanderson 1976), the literature has 
not reached consensus on the ultimate causes of the baby boom.   
  In a recent contribution, Greenwood, Seshadri, and Vandenbroucke (2005, henceforth GSV) 
advance a new and specific price-based explanation for the baby boom.  In an overlapping-
generations framework, they argue that a burst in the productivity of household technology led to a 
                                                   
1 Completed cohort fertility (measured at ages 41 to 61) is plotted with period fertility in figure 1.  Women born 
during the 1930s, the mothers of the “baby boomers,” had completed fertility rates as high as women born in the late 
nineteenth century.  
2 To be clear, the proposed Barro-Becker mechanism is not within-cohort inter-temporal substitution of births.  
Rather, the interpretation is that inter-temporal substitution occurs across cohorts as dynastic families substitute 
childbearing to generations when child-rearing costs are low.   2 
reduction in the shadow price of childbearing and, therefore, to a pronounced rise in fertility between 
1940 and 1960. 
  This paper examines the empirical content of the household-productivity explanation of the 
baby boom by drawing on an array of historical and empirical evidence.  First, we present direct 
evidence on the timing of the diffusion of modern household technologies, which began in earnest 
decades before the baby boom and continued afterwards.  Because growth in total factor productivity 
was exceptionally rapid during the 1940 to 1960 period (leading to an increase in wages and 
increasing the opportunity cost of childrearing), it is difficult to square these time-series with a 
relative burst of productivity in the household sector.   
  Because heterogeneity in the opportunity cost of childbearing might obscure the 
hypothesized positive relationship between household technology and childbearing, we next examine 
links between fertility and modern household technologies at the county-level in 1940, 1950 and 
1960.  Unconditional correlations, partial correlations from models using state fixed effects, and 
partial correlations from regressions with multiple covariates in both cross-sectional and first-
differenced specifications fail to support the household-productivity hypothesis.  Furthermore, the 
absence of a positive relationship does not appear to reflect differences in the timing of childbirth.  
Using census data on completed fertility (the number of children ever born by ages 41 to 60) and 
exposure to electrical service in early adulthood, time-series and regression evidence exhibits a 
negative (not a positive) relationship.   
  A final piece of evidence comes from the demographic history of the Old Order Amish.  
During the 1940s and 1950s, the Old Order Amish strictly limited their use of modern appliances on 
religious grounds, and therefore, remained isolated from these technology-induced gains in 
household productivity.  If new household technologies caused the baby boom, as hypothesized, then 
fertility change among the Amish should have been relatively small during this period.  We present 
evidence from the U.S. census that the Amish, in fact, had a rise in fertility that began at nearly the 
same time, lasted just as long, and was approximately as large as the baby boom in the rest of the 
U.S. population.  These findings are corroborated by independent studies of genealogical records that 
show a sizable increase in fertility among the Old Order Amish at the same time as the U.S. baby 
boom.   
  In summary, none of our three approaches supports the household-productivity explanation 
of the U.S. baby boom.  The paper’s final section interprets our findings using the Slutsky equation 
and discusses their implications for other explanations for the baby boom.  We conclude that more 3 
than a half century after its peak, the ultimate causes of the baby boom remain one of the twentieth 
century’s great puzzles.   
I.  The Diffusion of Household Technology in the First Half of the Twentieth Century 
  The household-productivity explanation of the baby boom requires an anomalous burst of 
technological progress in the household sector between 1940 and 1960.  Measurement problems 
inherent to both household production and new durable goods make it difficult to assess the 
plausibility of such a burst quantitatively and directly, but several pieces of evidence cast doubt on 
this interpretation of history.     
  Figure 2 illustrates the pattern of household appliance adoption from 1890 to 1970.  Rather 
than combining series into an index, figure 2 plots them separately to highlight the timing of 
diffusion for different technologies.  Although it is clear that improved household technologies 
diffused between 1940 and 1960, it is far less clear that the pace of progress accelerated relative to 
previous decades.  Rather, in the decades before the baby boom, households rapidly adopted indoor 
plumbing, electricity, electric irons, washing machines, refrigerators, modern stoves, modern 
lighting, and vacuum cleaners.   
  In 1890, only 24 percent of homes had running water and 13 percent had flush toilets; only 3 
percent of homes had electrical service in 1900, and essentially none had mechanical refrigerators, 
washing machines, or vacuum cleaners (Lebergott 1993: 101, 102, 113).  By 1940, the census 
reported that approximately 70 percent of households had running water, 60 percent had a private 
flush toilet, 79 percent had electrical lighting and nearly as many had electric irons,
3 44 percent had 
mechanical refrigerators, 54 percent had gas or electric stoves (rather than wood, coal, or kerosene), 
and 42 percent had central heating (Brunsman and Lowery 1943).  We estimate that between 40 and 
50 percent had power-driven washing machines in 1940.
4  The overwhelming impression in figure 2 
is that a strong upward trend in household production technology preceded the baby boom by at least 
three decades.   
  Historical scholarship cites early advances in other aspects of home production technology as 
well—improvements in stoves and the distribution of processed foods, including canned goods, 
refrigerated and preserved meat, and ready-to-eat cereals, transformed meal preparation during the 
                                                   
3 Lebergott estimates that 65 percent of homes owned electric irons in 1932, whereas about 68 percent had electrical 
lighting in 1930 (1976: 280, 288). 
4 The higher estimate (48 percent) is from multiplying figures for clothes washer ownership in 1940 among “wired” 
households (61 percent) from Bowden and Offer (1994: 745) by the proportion of occupied dwellings with electrical 
lighting (79 percent) from the U.S. Census (as reported in Brunsman and Lowery 1943: 91).  The lower estimate (43 
percent) is from using an alternative measure of “wired” houses (71 percent) from Bowden and Offer (1994). 4 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Giedion 1948, Strasser 1982, Cowan 1983, Harris 2008).  
Cowan writes, “By the turn of the century, canned goods were a standard feature of the American 
diet: women’s magazines contained advertisements for them on nearly every page, standard recipes 
routinely called for them, and the weekly food expenditures of even the poorest urban families 
regularly included them” (1983: 73).  Sewing machines diffused widely after 1850 (Godley 2001).  
Christine Frederick’s widely circulated writings (1912) on how to improve efficiency in household 
work were published decades before the baby boom and were a continuation of a literature that dates 
to the mid-nineteenth century work of Catharine Beecher (1841).  After 1960, automatic 
dishwashers, clothes dryers, air-conditioning, and microwaves were recasting patterns of housework 
yet again (Cox and Alm 1997: 22).     
  Price series for goods used in household production reinforce the notion that home 
productivity was rising long before the baby boom.  Nordhaus (1997) shows that the price of light 
fell from an index value of 10.0 in 1900 to 0.7 by 1940 when expressed relative to a consumer price 
index; he reports a decline from 0.220 in 1900 to 0.005 in 1940 when expressed relative to average 
earnings.
5  The price of residential electricity also fell rapidly in the first 40 years of the century (U.S. 
Department of Commerce 1975, series S-116). Rees (1961) constructs price indices for clothing and 
home furnishings (in which stoves get the largest weight) from 1890 to 1914, and these, too, show 
sizable declines.    
  Still, the steady diffusion of modern household technologies in the early twentieth century 
may be consistent with a burst of relative progress in household productivity if there were a mid-
century slowdown in market sector technological advance.  But this was not the case according to our 
best estimates of twentieth-century total factor productivity (TFP) trends.  Gordon (2000: 51) 
suggests that TFP growth peaked in the 1950-1964 period, followed closely in magnitude by the 
1928-1950 period.  He estimates that both periods registered higher growth rates than any other since 
1870.  Field challenges the primacy of the 1950-1964 period, but not the idea that productivity 
growth was at an historically high level during the baby boom.  He pushes emphasis back to the 
1930s, noting that technological advances in the 1930s provided “the basis for much of the labor and 
multifactor productivity improvements of the 1950s and 1960s” (2003: 1399).  GSV cite estimates of 
TFP growth of 1.41 percent per year from 1900 to 1948 and 1.68 percent per year from 1948 to 1974 
                                                   
5 The price of light continued to decline after 1940, but not in manner that suggests an increase in the pace of 
technological change in the baby boom years.  Comparable quality-adjusted price data for other goods is scarce prior 
to 1940, but Raff and Trajtenberg (1997) report large declines in the quality-adjusted price of automobiles relative to 
other goods, which would effectively lower the cost of home-produced transport services.   5 
(2005: 189, citing U.S. Bureau of Census 1975, Series W6, which is based on Kendrick (1961), and 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics).  Because all of these sources conclude that the market-sector 
productivity growth rate increased during the baby boom period, the argument for a relative 
acceleration of household technology is even more difficult to sustain than the argument for an 
absolute increase in the rate of household productivity growth.   
  Wage trends in figure 3 provide yet another way to characterize productivity growth in the 
market sector.
6  As with TFP, there is no evidence of a slowdown in real wage growth in the baby 
boom period.  We calculate an average growth rate of 2.7 percent from 1940 to 1960, compared to 
2.5 percent from 1920 to 1940, and 1.7 percent from 1900 to 1920. 
  It is difficult to create comprehensive long-run price series that accurately capture changes in 
durable goods’ quality (Griliches 1971, Bresnahan and Gordon 1997), and unadjusted price and 
quantity series from the national accounts may contain sizable biases that cannot be differenced out 
by expressing one series relative to another (Gordon 1990).  With these caveats, figure 4 presents 
Gordon’s (1990) quality-adjusted price series for consumer durables relative to producer durables 
(first available after 1947) alongside the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) series which reaches 
back further in time but is not adjusted for quality.  (Appendix 1 provides a more detailed discussion 
of the available time-series evidence from both sources).  Although the quality-adjusted Gordon data 
are probably preferable to the BEA data, they do not begin early enough to characterize the pre-war 
period.  Taking the BEA data series at face value, it appears that the baby boom took off in the 1940s 
despite a jump in the relative price of consumer durables and household appliances that kept relative 
prices high until at least 1950.  The relative price of consumer durables returned to its pre-war value 
by 1955, but fertility increased much less in the 1950s than in the 1940s.  If the BEA series is correct 
in suggesting a sharp rise in the relative price of goods used in household production during World 
War II, then the modest decline in the Gordon series in the late 1940s may reflect a return-to-trend 
rather than an unprecedented rate of advance.   
  The national-level time-series reviewed in this section do not evince a straightforward 
relationship between the baby boom and changes in household technology.  Rather than a large and 
coincident 20-year burst of productivity growth in home productivity, it appears that household 
technology improved and diffused gradually before, during, and after the baby boom.  Moreover, 
progress in household productivity between 1940 and 1960 was rivaled by unprecedented and 
                                                   
6 Our real wage index follows Margo (2006: 2-44).  The nominal wage index for unskilled labor is series Ba4218 
and the cost of living series is Cc2 (from Carter et al. 2006, based on David and Solar 1977). 6 
unsurpassed rates of growth in market productivity, which should have tended to depress fertility.  
Because national time-series data may mask important changes and variation in opportunity costs 
associated with childrearing and households’ capacity to upgrade home technologies, the following 
sections use more detailed data to shed light on the credibility of the household-productivity 
hypothesis.   
II.  Appliance Ownership, Electrification, and Fertility in Disaggregated Data 
  This section uses a newly-compiled, county-level panel dataset for the United States to 
examine the household-technology hypothesis directly.  To create this dataset, we encoded county-
level appliance ownership counts from the census volumes for the 1940 to 1960 period; these data 
are supplemented by publicly-available, county-level economic and demographic information 
(Haines 2004).  The resulting dataset contains approximately 3,000 counties (Hawaii and Alaska are 
excluded) for 1940, 1950 and 1960.
7   
  Our measure of the general fertility rate is the number of infants (under age one) per 1,000 
women of ages 15 to 44.  The level of household technology is measured as the proportion of 
housing units with refrigerators, washing machines, modern stoves (e.g., fueled by electricity or gas, 
rather than coal, wood, or kerosene), and electrical lighting.  The census data provide a 
geographically detailed view of the diffusion of modern appliances during the baby-boom period, but 
the census did not collect information on every appliance in each year.  Electrical service and 
refrigerators were reported in 1940 and 1950, washing machines only in 1960, and cooking fuel (an 
indicator of modern stoves) in 1940, 1950, and 1960 (see appendix 2 for more detail on data 
sources). 
  Table 1 reports means and standard deviations for each of our measures.  Consistent with 
figure 2, our data shows that the diffusion of electrical service and modern appliances was 
widespread.  The data provide new information about the differential timing of technology adoption 
across counties.  For instance, the increase in electrical service over the 1940s ranges from slow (an 
increase of roughly 8 percentage points at the 10th percentile) to rapid (49.8 at the 90
th percentile).  
From 1940 to 1960, the same is true for modern stoves: ownership rates rose by 35.2 percentage 
points at the 10
th percentile but by 84.9 at the 90
th percentile.  There is great variation in the 
magnitude of the baby boom as well.  Although more than 95 percent of counties recorded an 
                                                   
7 Consistent data on household appliances are unavailable in the micro-level IPUMS samples.  The 1940 and 1950 
public-use micro data samples do not include any information on household appliances.  The 1960 micro data 
sample includes information on washers, dryers, and freezers, but does not reveal geographic information below the 
state level. 7 
increase in fertility between 1940 and 1960, the size of the baby boom (in terms of our measure of 
the general fertility rate) ranged from 11.3 at the 10
th percentile to 66.1 at the 90
th percentile.   
Cross-Sectional Regressions 
  Our analysis uses the intertemporal and geographic variation in these measures within the 
following linear regression framework,  
(1)                          ∑   1          
          , 
where F is the fertility rate in county j and state s, A is our measure of the state of household 
technology, and 1( ) is a state dummy variable.  Covariates in X include median years of schooling 
for those over age 24, log of median property value for owner-occupied housing, log of median 
family income (in 1950 and 1960 only due to data constraints), racial composition, measures of local 
economic development (the proportion working in agriculture, the proportion working in 
manufacturing, the urban proportion of the county’s current population, and log population density), 
and a correlate of the opportunity cost of childrearing (the proportion of women in the labor force).   
  Table 2 reports least-squares estimates of τ separately for 1940, 1950 and 1960.  Each point 
estimate is from a separate, unweighted regression of the general fertility rate on appliance 
ownership.
8  Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are corrected for correlation within states and 
presented in brackets below each point estimate.  The specification in column 1 includes no 
covariates or fixed effects, and the unadjusted correlations between fertility and appliance ownership 
(refrigerators, modern stoves, and washing machines) are strongly negative.  These correlations are 
depicted in the scatterplots of figure 5: panel A plots county-level fertility rates against appliance 
ownership for 1940, and panels B and C plot data for 1950 and 1960, respectively.  None shows a 
positive relationship between fertility and these technologies. 
  One reason for the negative correlations might be unobserved heterogeneity in workers’ labor 
market productivity.  For example, wages may be positively correlated with appliance ownership and 
negatively correlated with fertility.  Omitting such variables from the regression may induce a 
negative bias in the point estimate of interest.  To reduce the scope for this source of omitted variable 
bias, column 2 includes state fixed effects—which adjusts for average differences in wages or other 
unobservables across states—and column 3 adds the full set of county-level demographic and 
economic covariates described above.  Identifying  τ  from within-state variation in appliance 
ownership and fertility (column 2) tends to increase the magnitude of the point estimates slightly.  
                                                   
8 Results from quantile regressions at the median, which are less sensitive to outliers than OLS, yield results that are 
qualitatively similar to the OLS estimates reported in tables 2, 3 and 4. See web appendix 3. 8 
Adding controls for county-level characteristics (column 3) results in point estimates that are smaller 
in magnitude, but none of the six estimates is positive and statistically significant.
9  Moreover, the 
largest point estimate (0.068 on washing machines in 1960) in conjunction with a 30 percentage 
point increase in washing machine ownership (the change in national average in figure 2) implies an 
increase of 2.0 infants per 1,000 women ages 15 to 44.  Even using the upper bound of the 95 percent 
confidence interval implies an increase of only 6.2 infants.  Because the baby boom entailed an 
increase of about 45 infants per 1,000 women, the magnitude of this exceptional point estimate, even 
at the outer reaches of its confidence interval, is not consistent with the hypothesis that appliance 
diffusion caused the baby boom.   
  As an additional sensitivity check, we used the percentage of households with electrical lights 
to instrument for modern appliance ownership in the fertility regressions for 1940 and 1950 (years in 
which the census documented electrical lighting).  The results show negative point estimates on 
appliance ownership in every case.  Having access to electricity was a binding constraint on the use 
of many modern technologies, but it is difficult to establish that electrification is excludable from the 
fertility equation, and it is possible that an association between the instrumental variable and the 
omitted variables of concern may bias the estimates.  For instance, local electrification initiatives 
may have affected households’ adoption of technology and local economic development.  With these 
caveats in mind, readers may refer to appendix 3 to see the detailed results and weigh the evidence.  
First-Differenced Regressions 
  Although our covariates are fairly exhaustive, one potential problem with the cross-sectional 
regressions is that unobserved differences in the demand for children may influence both appliance 
ownership and fertility outcomes.  For instance, counties with permanently higher opportunity costs 
of childbearing that are not captured by the control variables may adopt appliances first and also have 
lower fertility rates.  To account for these unobserved differences, we estimate first-differenced 
regressions.
10  First-differenced specifications eliminate time-invariant, unobservable county-level 
differences that may be correlated with the timing of technology adoption and the baby boom,   
                                                   
9 For 1950 and 1960, in addition to the control for median income, we can add control variables for the proportion of 
families with low income (below $2,000 in 1950 or $3,000 in 1960) and high income (above $5,000 in 1950 or 
above $10,000 in 1960) to capture differences in the income distribution.  The additional controls have a small effect 
on the coefficients and standard errors reported in table 2.  We cannot use the IPUMS data to calculate even richer 
county-level characterizations of the income distribution because county codes are not revealed in the 1950 or 1960 
public use samples.  There is no family income variable for 1940.     
10 Suppose the household productivity hypothesis is correct, but that in cross sections unobserved opportunity costs 
obscure the true positive relationship between appliances and fertility.  New appliances are quickly adopted in the 
 9 
(2)     ∆         ∆        ∆      ∑     1          
         , 
where  denotes county-level changes in the variable over a 10 or 20 year period (either from 1940 
to 1950, 1950 to 1960, or 1940 to 1960), and the remaining notation is as previously described.  In 
this specification, observed, time-varying county characteristics (including changes in women’s labor 
market participation rates) are captured in ∆ ;
11 and the effects of unobserved, fixed differences are 
differenced out by design.  State fixed effects now absorb unobserved changes at the state level, such 
as changes in perceived prosperity, policy, or other relevant conditions that may otherwise bias the 
point estimates.  County-level, unobservable shocks that are correlated with changes in appliance 
ownership and fertility are the primary source of potential bias for the coefficient of interest.
12   
  Table 3 reports unweighted, least-squares estimates of     for three specifications.  Column 1 
presents correlations from a specification with no covariates, column 2 includes state fixed effects, 
and column 3 includes ∆  s for pairs of census years with information on the same appliance 
measures (1940 to 1950, 1950 to 1960, or 1940 to 1960).  As in table 2, heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors are computed and corrected for correlation within states for all specifications 
reported.  The unadjusted correlations between appliance and fertility changes are negative, as shown 
in column 1 and in the scatterplots of figure 6.  The within-state correlations are also negative 
(column 2).  When we account for observable changes in county-level covariates (including women’s 
labor-force participation), unobservable state-level changes, and time-invariant county-level 
unobservable characteristics (column 3), the estimates are still negative.
13  If anything, the first-
                                                                                                                                                                    
high-opportunity-cost counties, and fertility there rises from a low initial level.  New appliances are not adopted in 
the low-opportunity-cost counties until later, and, therefore, fertility does not rise until later.  In cross-sectional 
regressions, the strong positive correlation between appliance adoption and wages and negative correlation between 
wages and fertility might lead to a negative point estimate.  If this were the case, however, changes in fertility would 
be positively correlated with changes in appliance ownership even if the cross sectional relationship between the 
level of appliance ownership and level of fertility is negative. 
11 Because median family income is unobservable in 1940, differenced regressions with 1940 cannot include the 
change in log median family income as a control variable.  However, it can be included in panel C of table 3 (1950-
60 difference), in which case it slightly strengthens the negative coefficient (-0.053, s.e. = 0.055).  Adding controls 
for the changes in the proportions of families with low and high income levels further strengthens the negative 
coefficient (-0.097, s.e. = 0.061).  Given the available census categories, “low income” denotes below $2,000 in 
1950 and below $3,000 in 1960; “high income” denotes above $5,000 in 1950 and above $10,000 in 1960.    
12 Omitting the control variable for observed changes in women’s labor market participation has a small effect on 
the coefficients of interest in table 3. This suggests that the scope for bias from unobservable changes in women’s 
market opportunities may be small relative to what one would need to account for the baby boom. 
13 For brevity, we omit one set of results (1940-50 change in modern stoves) in which the estimate in column 3 is 
positive but statistically insignificant (0.083, s.e. = 0.052). As before, this estimate is too small to account for a 
substantial portion of the baby boom.  It should also be considered in light of the 1940 to 1960 (panel B) and the 
1950 to 1960 (panel C) regressions which exhibit negative point estimates.   10 
differenced regressions provide evidence that counties with greater growth in appliance ownership 
experienced smaller increases in their fertility rate.   
  Similar to above, we used the change in the percentage of households with electrical lights to 
instrument for the change in appliance ownership to provide an additional sensitivity check.  The 
resulting point estimates on appliance ownership become more negative in the second stage in each 
case (compared to the OLS results), as reported in web appendix 3.  The same caveats that were 
discussed above apply here, and we leave it to interested readers to weigh the evidence from the 
instrumental variable regressions. 
Electrification as a Measure of Household Technology 
  A potential concern with the regressions in tables 2 and 3 is that appliance ownership might 
be a poor measure of the “state of household technology.”  From the perspective of households, 
access to electrical service may be a better indicator of the “state of household technology”: few 
families that had electrical service available to them declined to have lights (or electric irons), 
whereas the decision to purchase specific, large consumer durable goods might have reflected a 
variety of household-level differences in preferences, prices, and plans.  Another advantage of using 
electrical service is that it is a relatively homogenous and easily comparable product across locations 
and time.   
  Our data on county-level electrification come from the published volumes of the Census of 
Housing in 1950 and from the Haines (2004) county files for 1940.
14  Panels A and B of table 4 
report estimates from separate, unweighted, least-squares regressions using equation 1, and panel C 
reports estimates from a regression of the change in the fertility rate on the change in electrical 
service between 1940 and 1950 using equation 2.  Overall, the cross-sectional and first-differenced 
results provide no evidence of a positive relationship between electrification and fertility.  The 
unconditional correlations are negative and remain so even after accounting for economic and 
demographic differences and changes in column 3.
15   
  Taken together, the results provide no evidence consistent with improvements in household 
technology causing the baby boom.  Whatever caused the baby boom worked against secular 
economic forces that tended to reduce U.S. fertility rates over this period. 
                                                   
14 The census does not report electric lighting in 1960.  In 1960 more than 98 percent of homes had electrical service 
(United States Department of Commerce 1975).  
15 Adding control variables for the proportions of low and high income families to the 1950 regression raises the 
coefficient from -0.375 to -0.262; the standard error falls from 0.083 to 0.066, so the result is still significantly 
negative.  Family income variables are not available in 1940. 11 
Electrification and Completed Fertility  
  A separate matter of concern is that changes in period fertility rates might not adequately 
reflect changes in completed fertility.  For instance, if household technology affects the timing of 
births in addition to the total number of children, then period measures of fertility (which capture 
birth timing) would be inadequate measures of lifetime fertility adjustments.  If improvements in 
household productivity induced more childbearing, snapshots of the number of children in 
households in 1940 and 1950 could miss childbearing that has not yet occurred.  Although period 
rates and completed fertility are highly correlated (see figure 1), we use the Integrated Public Use 
Microdata Series (IPUMS, Ruggles et al. 2008) to construct completed fertility rates for women ages 
41 to 60 in 1980 and 1990.  These micro-data are aggregated into birth-state-year-of-birth cells.  We 
then link these estimates of completed fertility with newly-entered data from archived issues of the 
Edison Electrical Institute’s Statistical Bulletin, which contain annual, state-level information on the 
number of residential electrical service customers from 1925 to 1960.  With this information, each 
woman can be assigned an “electrical service exposure index” based on her year of birth and state of 
birth, which is the average ratio of electric customers over total households in that state during the 
time in which the woman would have been at the peak of her childbearing years (ages 15 to 29).
16  
This index is a rough measure of the probability of having access to electricity during the main years 
of family formation.
17  It corresponds to the spirit of the GSV model, which assumes that households 
make decisions about the number of children in the first period of adulthood based upon the current 
“state of household technology.”  Given the available data, the index can only be constructed for 
women born from 1910 (ages 15 to 29 from 1925 to 1939) to 1931 (ages 15 to 29 from 1946 to 
1960).  The final sample consists of women born in the U.S. between 1910 and 1931 in the 1960 to 
1990 IPUMS.
18    
                                                   
16 We divided the EEI customer counts by the Census of Housing counts of families (1920 and 1930) or occupied 
dwelling units (1940-1960) in each state to estimate the proportion of families with electrical service.  We 
interpolated the housing counts between census dates.  This choice of denominator is consistent with the housing 
unit counts in Carter et al. (2006).  See Kenneth Snowden’s discussion (volume 4: 4-500 and 4-501):  “Before 1940 
the census enumerated ‘families’ and not housing unit[s]…. However, the two concepts are closely related:  a census 
family was defined in 1930 as a single person living alone, a small group of unrelated persons sharing living 
accommodations, or, more normally, a group of related persons who live together as one household.  Despite 
differences in terminology, therefore, the basic notion of a family, dwelling unit, or housing unit has provided 
essentially comparable measures of the residential housing stock since 1890.”  
17 The median age of last birth for these cohorts was approximately 29.   
18 In the EEI data, Maryland and Washington DC customers are always counted together, and North Carolina and 
South Carolina customers are often counted together.  For consistency we have used these larger units of 
aggregation for all years, which yields 47 birth state groups. The choice of birth cohorts is due to the fact that 
completed fertility peaked around the birth cohorts of 1935. Our birth cohorts cover most of the increase in 
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  The hypothesized positive correlation between completed fertility and advances in household 
technology can be tested by exploiting variation in the timing of electrification in women’s state of 
birth using the following linear regression framework,  
(3)                             ∑   1          
      ∑   1            
             , 
where y denotes the birth cohort (inferred from age and year of observation) and b denotes the state 
of birth; N is the mean self-reported number of children ever born (excluding miscarriages and still-
births); EXP is the “exposure to electricity” index; and    and    capture year-of-birth invariant 
differences across birth states, k, and state-of-birth invariant differences across birth cohorts, j,, 
respectively.  The set of demographic controls is limited, because measures of income, place of 
residence, and other life circumstances at the time of observation in 1960 to 1990 are poor proxies 
for circumstances in early adulthood.  As a result, Z includes a constant and characteristics that 
should vary little over the life-course but are strongly correlated with differences in lifetime income 
and socio-economic status:  the proportion of the cohort that is “nonwhite”; mean educational 
attainment; and, in one specification, the mean of husbands’ educational attainment and proportion of 
husbands who are nonwhite, which are only observed for women residing with their husbands at the 
time of the census.   
  Table 5 presents population-weighted least-squares estimates from specifications that add 
fixed effects and control variables sequentially.  Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are 
corrected for correlation within states and are reported in brackets beneath the point estimates.  
Column 1 presents the unadjusted correlation between children-ever-born and exposure to electricity.  
Column 2 adds state- and year-of-birth fixed effects.  Column 3 includes controls for the woman’s 
race and education level, and column 4 includes her husband’s education level (this reduces the 
sample to women who are currently married at the time of observation).  We prefer the specifications 
that include birth-state and birth-year fixed effects (columns 2 to 4), as they rely upon within-state 
variation in the speed of electrification to estimate  .  In contrast to the hypothesized positive link 
between the state of household technology and completed fertility, cohorts born into states with 
higher rates of electrification in their early adult years had fewer children on average.  Regardless of 
specification, the inclusion of covariates has a negligible impact on the magnitude of the point 
estimates of interest.  Overall, the estimates in table 5 provide evidence that the “state of household 
technology,” as embodied in electrification, is not positively associated with completed fertility.   
                                                                                                                                                                    
completed fertility for the cohorts born between 1920 and 1935 as well as 10 years of cohorts prior to the increase.   13 
  In summary, this section’s empirical tests using county-level data with the best available 
measures of appliance ownership, electrification, and the general fertility rate provide no evidence 
that advances in household technology caused the baby boom.  After controlling for a host of 
observable characteristics and fixed effects, the point estimates are negative or small in magnitude 
(table 2, 3, and 4).  The negative relationship between exposure to electricity in young adulthood and 
completed fertility measured at ages 41 to 60 in census data (table 5) also fails to support the claim 
that advances in household technology caused the baby boom.   
III.  Outen the Lights:  The Amish Baby Boom  
  The regression evidence in section II is informative, but it is subject to potential limitations.  
On the one hand, interpretation of a simple partial correlation from a regression specification without 
covariates may be obscured by cross-sectional heterogeneity or omitted variable bias.  On the other 
hand, controlling for endogenous variables like income—the outcome of a household’s labor supply 
decision that may be correlated with appliance diffusion—may also confound interpretation of the 
estimates.  Adding to these complications, estimating equations described in (1) and (2) may be mis-
specified because fertility may be a nonlinear function of the “state of household technology” and the 
present discounted value of lifetime wages—both unobserved by the econometrician.  There is no 
simple way to deal with these critiques directly. 
  As an alternative test of the household-productivity hypothesis, we investigate fertility 
change among a group that limited its use of modern household conveniences and appliances 
powered by electricity: the Old Order Amish.
19  In 1963 sociologist John Hostetler wrote, “The most 
universal of all Amish norms across the United States and Canada are the following: no electricity, 
telephones, central-heating systems, automobiles, or tractors with pneumatic tires…” (61).  The 
Amish did not completely reject changes in household production technology, but it is clear that the 
Amish adopted modern appliances much less frequently and much later than the U.S. farm and 
general populations.
20  It is also clear that the Amish produced agricultural and craft goods for a 
broad market of consumers; they were not cut off from the market economy.  If rapid improvements 
in the state of household technology were the main cause of the midcentury baby boom and the 
Amish were less “treated” with modern household technology, then one would expect a relatively 
                                                   
19 The Amish began settling in Pennsylvania in the early 1700s and later settled in parts of Ohio, New York, Indiana, 
Illinois, and Ontario.  For background on the Amish, see Hostetler (1963) or Nolt (1992).   
20 Hostetler explains, “The social organization of the Amish community has little facility for dealing with change.  
The general effort to preserve the old and degrade the new is so pervasive that change must occur slowly…” (1963: 
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small change in Amish fertility.  The absence of a baby boom among the Amish, therefore, would be 
consistent with the household-technology centered explanation of the baby boom.  To examine 
Amish fertility, we use two sources: demographic studies based upon genealogical records and our 
own analysis of census data.   
  The literature on Amish demography, which is typically based upon analyses of 
comprehensive genealogical records, indicates that fertility rates increased at approximately the same 
time as among the general U.S. population.  Ericksen et al. (1979) compiled data from the four 
largest Amish settlements in the United States: Lancaster, Pennsylvania; Elkhart, Indiana; and 
Holmes and Geauga Counties, Ohio.  Between the 1909-18 birth cohort of Amish women and the 
1929-38 cohort, they document a decline in the proportion of childless women, a rise in age-specific 
marital fertility for 20-24 and 25-29 year olds, and a rise in cumulative marital fertility by about 0.6 
children at age 35 (258-260).  This corresponds fairly closely to our census-based estimates, which 
are presented below.  Markle and Pasco (1977) relied on the Indiana Amish Directory from 1971 to 
calculate period fertility rates.  Between 1935-39 and 1955-59, the average age at marriage for 
women in their sample fell from 22.8 to 20.8 years, and the average time between marriage and first 
birth declined.  Between 1935-39 and 1960-64, they also document large increases in birthrates 
among women in their 20s (274, figure 1).
21  Most recently, Greska (2002) compiled data from a 
1993 directory for the Amish settlement in Geauga, Ohio, including 1,337 women.  Consistent with 
the studies above, he finds a dip in age at first marriage and age at first birth for the 1928-37 birth 
cohorts of women, and he reports that the 1928-37 cohorts had a cumulative fertility rate that was 
0.42 higher than the 1908-17 cohorts, and 0.49 higher than the 1918-27 cohorts (195-197).   
  We can corroborate this interpretation of Amish demographic history by examining 
completed fertility of Amish and non-Amish women from the same birth cohorts in the IPUMS.  
Specifically, using information on the primary language spoken at home (Pennsylvania Dutch) in the 
1940, 1980, and 1990 IPUMS (the only census years with information on language spoken and 
children ever born), we attempt to document changes in completed fertility among the Amish.  It is 
well established that the Old Order Amish speak Pennsylvania Dutch and that the vast majority of 
active, primary speakers of Pennsylvania Dutch are Old Order Amish (or from smaller groups of 
                                                   
21 Markle and Pasco do not report the exact birthrate figures, but rather present a graph (1977: 274, figure 1).  From 
their figure, we infer that the birthrate (divided by 1000) for women aged 20-24 increased from approximately 0.30 
to 0.53, and for women 25-29 it increased from about 0.38 to 0.48.  In earlier work, Smith (1960) studied the Amish 
in rural southeastern Pennsylvania.  He also reports that birth spacing was significantly shorter for Amish women 
who married in the 1940s and 1950s compared to earlier cohorts (104).   15 
conservative Old Order Mennonites).
22  Because we do not observe religion in the Census, we call 
the sample of those who report Pennsylvania Dutch as their primary language the “likely Amish.”  
To obtain the largest possible sample, we pool all of the available 1940, 1980 and 1990 IPUMS 
samples.  The resulting sample of likely Amish consists of 1,915 women ages 35 to 85 at the time of 
observation who spoke Pennsylvania Dutch at home (1980 and 1990) or as their mother tongue 
(1940).  For comparison groups, we create samples of ever-married women in the same birth cohorts 
who were residing on farms in Indiana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania (states with the largest Amish 
populations) and all U.S. women not residing on farms. 
  Figure 7 plots the mean number of children ever born by birth cohort (web appendix 2 
presents summary statistics for this sample).  In each year, U.S. native, nonfarm residents have the 
lowest completed fertility rate, followed by women on farms in Indiana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania.  
The “likely Amish” women had higher levels of completed fertility than the non-farm population, as 
one might expect in an agrarian population, but comparable levels to the farm populations of Indiana, 
Ohio, and Pennsylvania.  The key result of this analysis is that the fertility trend of the “likely 
Amish” closely tracks those in the two comparison groups.  In a reversal of a long period of fertility 
decline, each of the groups in figure 7—including the Amish—had large increases in completed 
fertility among the cohorts of women born after 1910.  In the U.S. nonfarm sample and in the 
Indiana, Ohio and Pennsylvania farm sample, completed fertility increased by roughly 0.87 (s.e. 
0.004) and 1.03 (s.e. 0.070) births per woman, respectively, from trough (1900-1909) to peak cohorts 
(1930-34).  The “likely Amish” group experienced a statistically significant increase of 1.24 births 
(s.e. 0.24) over the same period, which is statistically indistinguishable from the farm population 
baby boom.   
  Given that we cannot observe religious affiliation in the census data and that non-Amish 
speakers of Pennsylvania Dutch may contaminate our sample, we examine the robustness of our 
                                                   
22 In personal correspondence, Karen Johnson-Weiner, a linguist associated with the Elizabethtown College Amish 
Studies Program and a Professor of Anthropology at SUNY-Potsdam, confirmed that the overwhelming majority of 
Pennsylvania German speakers (how linguists often refer to Pennsylvania Dutch) are Old Order Amish or 
conservative “horse-and-buggy” groups of Old Order Mennonites.  See also Moelleken (1988) and Huffines (1980) 
who discuss the persistence of Pennsylvania Dutch among the Amish and its decline among secular speakers.  
Elizabethtown College’s Amish Studies program in the Young Center for Anabaptist and Pietest Studies provides 
helpful information in this regard.  The Center’s website notes that “Regardless of where they live, the Amish speak 
the Pennsylvania German dialect (popularly known as Pennsylvania Dutch), except in a few communities where 
they speak a Swiss Dialect.”  This is the primary language of the Amish.  It also notes that “Although the Amish 
originally comprised only a small minority of the Pennsylvania German-speaking population [in the 1700s], they 
and the Old Order Mennonites are the last groups to use the language actively and pass it on to their children” 
(Kraybill et al. 2010).  16 
findings for the “likely Amish” using several approaches.  Our first check entails restricting the 
sample to those who reported having no telephone in 1980 and 1990, which we plot in figure 7 for 
comparison.
23  This restriction is likely to capture the most observant of the Older Order Amish and 
eliminate secular speakers of Pennsylvania Dutch.  The no-phone likely Amish sample has a 
substantially higher fertility rate than the other groups, and it experienced a similar rise in fertility 
from trough to peak of 1.3 births, s.e. 0.50, p-value 0.073).   
  Our second check entails excluding everyone from the likely Amish sample that resided in 
Pennsylvania, which is where non-Amish speakers of Pennsylvania Dutch would most likely be 
concentrated.  This sample restriction alters the results little.  The 1910-to-peak increase is 0.83 
births (s.e. 0.40, p-value 0.04).   
  Our third check is a back-of-envelope calculation to estimate the proportion of the “likely 
Amish” sample that would have to be misclassified to generate the observed increase in fertility if, in 
fact, the Amish did not have a baby boom.  Let FA be Old Order Amish fertility, FN be fertility among 
those who are not Old Order Amish, and F* be the completed fertility we observe for those who speak 
Pennsylvania Dutch at home in 1980 and 1990.  Observed fertility of Pennsylvania-Dutch speakers can be 
written as a weighted average of the two groups, aFA+(1-a)FN=F*, where a is a scalar weight representing 
the proportion of Pennsylvania Dutch speakers who are Old Order Amish, 0≤a≤1.  The change in F* from 
trough (1900-1909) to peak cohorts (1930-34), ΔF*, can be written as ΔF*= (1-a)ΔFN, under the null 
hypothesis that the Old Order Amish did not have a baby boom (ΔFA=0) and that a is time-invariant.  
How large would 1-a (the proportion of non-Amish, Pennsylvania Dutch speakers) have to be in order for 
us to find a baby boom equal in size to ΔF* if there were no increase among the Amish (ΔFA=0)?  
Fertility among U.S. farm residents increased by 1.03, which we use to proxy ΔFN.  Fertility among those 
in our sample of Likely Old Order Amish (no phones), ΔF*, increased by 1.3.  Therefore, we estimate 
that our mis-measurement of the Amish would have to be (1-a) = ΔF*/ ΔFN   1.3/1.03 =1.26, which is 
impossible since 1-a must be less than 1.  Alternatively, taking ΔF* to be the increase among the non-
Pennsylvania-resident Pennsylvania Dutch speakers, the measurement error would have to be severe at 80 
percent to generate the observed baby boom if the Amish did not have one.  Not only is this an 
implausibly high misclassification rate, but it is also inconsistent with the demographic literature 
cited above, which shows evidence of a conspicuous increase in fertility in Amish genealogical 
records that are not subject to the same concerns about misclassification.  In short, the evidence 
                                                   
23 The Old Order Amish remain more conservative than some other Anabaptist groups who may also speak 
Pennsylvania Dutch.  See Kraybill (1994) for discussion of splits within the Amish and differences across groups in 
appliance use in the 1990s in Holmes County, Ohio; see Umble (1994) for a discussion of phone use. 17 
strongly suggests that the Amish had a baby boom that roughly began at the same time, lasted at least 
as long, and matched the magnitude of the boom in the rest of the U.S. population.    
IV.  Implications for Theories of Fertility and the Baby Boom 
  On its face, empirical evidence that fertility did not rise with changes in technology seems 
inconsistent with canonical price theory. How could a reduction in the price of childrearing 
(embodied in the improvement of household technology) not result in an increase in the number of 
children born?  
  To reconcile this paper’s evidence with economic theory, consider a static framework where 
households maximize utility, U(N,H,Z), defined over a composite, non-home-produced commodity, 
Z (referred to as the composite good); the number of children, N; and a non-child, home-produced 
good, H. Some examples of the goods in H  might include listening to music (produced with a 
combination of time and a record player or radio); cleaning one’s home or clothing (produced with 
time and a washing machine or other appliances); or making or ironing one’s clothes (produced with 
time and a sewing machine or iron).  Alternatively, H might be conceptualized as “child quality” as 
considered in Becker (1960), Becker and Lewis (1973), and Willis (1973), because child quality 
might include commodities like healthy meals, which may require fresh produce or meat to be 
refrigerated, or dance lessons, which could require automobile transportation to schools or studios.  
Let the price of the composite good, p, be normalized to 1; the relative shadow price of children be 
pN; and relative shadow price of non-child household goods be pH. Assume there is an exogenous 
shock, A, that reduces pN and potentially pH.   
  In this framework, the demand for children is a function of the relative prices and income, I; 
that is, N=N(pN,pH, I).  Differentiating with respect to A and using the Slutsky equation, the impact of 
A on the number of children can be summarized, 
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    0 , if children are a normal good.  Here, the sign of the first bracketed term 
multiplied by  
   
    in equation 4 is positive:  both the substitution and income effects encourage the 
production of more children when the shadow price of children falls as A rises.  The sign of the 
second bracketed term is theoretically ambiguous.  For instance, if N and H are gross substitutes 18 
(implying the cross-price effect is positive, 
   
   
 
  
       ,   ,    0 ) and the price of the other good 
falls with A, 
   
    0 , then the sign would be positive.     
  This framework organizes several insights about price-based explanations for the baby boom.  
Consider, first, the case where A represents an exogenous improvement in household technology, 
which would affect both the price of children and of other home-produced goods.  In the generalized 
framework of equation 4, this implies that improvements in household technology have a 
theoretically ambiguous impact on children born.  A crucial, simplifying assumption underlying the 
unambiguously positive relationship between household productivity and the number of children in 
the GSV model is that there is only one home-produced good.  Assuming that households do not 
value other home produced goods, H, implies that the second bracketed term in equation 4 is zero, 
which implies that the number of children rises with the productivity of household technology, or 
  
  >0.   
  The addition of H to the model, however, implies that the fertility response depends upon the 
relative magnitudes of the first and second bracketed terms in equation 4, as well as the magnitude of 
the change in the shadow prices of N and H.  A baby boom or a baby bust (or neither) may result in 
response to an increase in A.  And, even if the number of children does increase on net with advances 
in household technology, reductions in the price of other home-produced goods or, perhaps, 
substitution toward child quality (away from quantity) would temper the magnitude of this positive 
fertility response.
24  Thus, it is far from a foregone conclusion that a baby boom should result from 
even a large improvement in household technology.   
  It is precisely this theoretical ambiguity that motivates our empirical analysis.  Through the 
lens of this framework, our empirical results do not support the household-technology explanation of 
the baby boom, but they are consistent with other home-produced commodities (with prices also 
impacted by advances in household technology) being gross substitutes with children during the 1940 
to 1960 period.
25 
                                                   
24 Mokyr (2000) describes an historical shift in demand for cleanliness driven by changes in knowledge about the 
sources of disease that is consistent with naming H “child quality.”   
25 Analyzing the indirect impact of household technology on the U.S. population and the Amish is also possible in 
this framework.  One possible indirect effect of technology on the Amish is through market prices for Amish goods 
sold to the market.  A reduction in the sales price of Amish goods would reduce Amish incomes and, therefore, 
reduce consumption of both children and other goods.  On the other hand, it would reduce the opportunity cost of 
childrearing and therefore have an ambiguous impact on fertility.  The net impact of these effects could increase 
Amish fertility, but it would be remarkable if the combination of these indirect effects increased Amish fertility by 
roughly as much as the direct effects of household technology in the rest of the population.  Moreover, to argue that 
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  Consider, next, two cases in which exogenous shocks may have affected the cost of children 
through channels other than household technology: a fall in young women’s wages in the wake of 
World War II (Doepke et al. 2008) and improvements in medical technology specific to child-birth 
and rearing (Albanesi and Olivetti 2009).  Like household-production technology shocks, a fall in 
young women’s relative wages following World War II would affect both the price of children and 
the price of other home-produced goods.  If children are more intensive in young women’s time than 
other home-produced goods, then the reduction in young women’s potential wages would induce 
households to shift towards more home goods and children in particular.  Offsetting this effect would 
be the reduction in a household’s permanent income (through a drop in women’s potential, 
permanent earnings), which would tend to reduce the number of children.  The fertility response, 
therefore, depends upon these price and income elasticities as well as the magnitudes of the shifts in 
relative prices.   
  Improvement in medical technology specific to child-birth and rearing may also have price 
and income effects.  If, for instance, these improvements affected only the shadow price of having or 
rearing children (the introduction of infant formula, for instance) and 
   
    0 , then the fertility effect 
would be unambiguously positive.  If, on the other hand, the new technologies affected the shadow 
price of other home production or permanent income (through changes in maternal morbidity, for 
instance), then the fertility response would, again, be theoretically ambiguous.   
  Because economic theory does not provide definitive answers about the sign or magnitude of 
the effects of changes in young women’s wages or improvements in medical technology, detailed 
empirical investigations of each of these hypotheses will be important contributions to future 
research on the baby boom.  Our specific analyses of the diffusion of household technology in 
sections I and II do not bear directly on these alternative explanations, but close historical and 
econometric investigations will prove helpful in assessing them.  For example, there was 
considerable variation across places in the intensity of wartime production and women’s wartime 
labor force participation (Dresser 1994; Acemoglu, Autor, and Lyle 2004), which might shed light on 
the strength of war-induced, labor-supply shocks that affected young women’s wages and, more 
generally, could help test explanations that emphasize World War II’s role in the baby boom.  
Likewise, variation in levels and changes in maternal and infant health (Thomasson and Treber 2008; 
Jayachandran, Lleras-Muney, and Smith 2010) might shed light on the medical technology 
                                                                                                                                                                    
these indirect price effects explain the fertility increase among the Amish is, fundamentally, to propose an 
alternative to the household technology explanation for the baby boom.   20 
hypothesis.  In addition, developing case studies of groups or places that were relatively “untreated” 
in a dimension that is specific to the hypothesis at hand may provide valuable evidence, though such 
exceptions are difficult to find.
26    
  Finally, our evidence does not bear directly on Easterlin’s long-standing hypothesis (1961, 
1980), and the data’s lack of support for the mechanism proposed in GSV is not an implicit 
endorsement of the Easterlin explanation.  Unlike the comparatively new hypotheses of GSV (2005), 
Doepke et al. (2008), and Albanesi and Olivetti (2009), a large empirical literature explores 
Easterlin’s hypothesized changes in “material aspirations”.   Because these are difficult to observe 
directly or identify econometrically,
27 and detailed family income data are sparse in the first half of 
the twentieth century, tests of the Easterlin hypothesis have yielded mixed results (Pampel and Peters 
1995, Macunovich 1998), and the extent to which intergenerational shifts in preferences can explain 
the U.S. baby boom remains unclear.    
V.  Conclusions   
  The mid-twentieth-century rise in fertility is a compelling puzzle not only because it was a 
dramatic departure from the previous 100 years of American demographic history, but also because it 
unfolded against a background of rising income, urbanization, educational attainment, infant health, 
and women’s labor force participation—many of the factors that economists and demographers 
typically associate with declining fertility.  Women who reached their childbearing years in the 1940s 
and 1950s (women born between 1920 and 1935) got married younger, bore their first child sooner, 
and had more children over their lifetimes than women born earlier and later in the century.  More 
than 50 years since the baby boom’s peak, there is no scholarly consensus about its causes.   
  Our goal in this paper is to weigh the empirical evidence supporting the importance of 
changes in household-productivity in causing the baby boom.  This explanation is clearly articulated 
and explicitly linked to electrification and modern household appliances, which allows us to test its 
empirical content.  Three alternative methodologies provide no support for this explanation of the 
baby boom:  Timeseries patterns in the diffusion of household technology and electrification provide 
no evidence of acceleration in household productivity over the period of the baby boom. Linear 
                                                   
26 The Amish, for example, were connected to the rest of economy through their production and sale of agricultural 
goods; they did not refuse modern medical care; and many served in the Civilian Public Service during World War 
II (Hershberger 1951).  They did not, however, embrace modern household appliances.  These characteristics make 
them a useful comparison group in the context of our study, but perhaps less useful in testing other explanations of 
the baby boom.   
27 Malmendier and Nagel (2009) find evidence consistent with the claim that the macroeconomic environment early 
in one’s life can have a persistent influence on attitudes toward financial risk. 21 
regressions using county-level data and alternative measures of the “state of household technology,” 
in specifications with and without covariates in each year from 1940 to 1960 and in first-differenced 
regressions, show no evidence of a positive correlation between measures of household productivity 
and fertility.  Finally, a large, coincident fertility increase among the Amish further challenges the 
hypothesis that modern household production technology caused the U.S. baby boom.  Overall, the 
empirical evidence is consistent with a model in which other home-produced commodities are gross 
substitutes for the quantity of children.   
  Although this paper concentrates on a single specific hypothesis, insights emerge that can 
inform broader research on demographic history and the baby boom.  First, whatever factors explain 
the American baby boom must account for its occurrence in urban and rural areas, among different 
educational and racial groups, and in all regions.  It was a remarkably pervasive event, and scholars 
should endeavor to explain the near simultaneity of baby booms in places and populations that varied 
widely in their social and economic circumstances (Jones and Tertilt 2008).  At the same time, we 
find that although the baby boom was widespread, the boom was not evenly spread, and the variation 
in changes in fertility invites analyses based on detailed cross-place and cross-household data.  Both 
Easterlin’s pioneering work and Greenwood, Seshadri, and Vandenbroucke’s argument are based on 
national-level time-series patterns in the United States, but more disaggregated views may prove 
extremely valuable, and indeed necessary, for discerning among the many potential causes.   22 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics, U.S. County-Level Data 
 
  1940 1950 1960 
     


























Proportion of housing units with a 
modern stove (using gas or 








Proportion of housing units with a 
power-driven washing machine 
--- --- 78.3 
(12.4) 
 
Notes: The table reports unweighted averages across U.S. counties (excluding Hawaii and Alaska).  
Standard deviations are in parentheses.  Counties that are omitted from table 2’s regressions are also 
excluded in this table, but this has little effect on the reported figures. 
 
Sources: Infants per woman, proportion of homes with lights (in 1940), refrigerators, and washing 
machines are from Haines (2004).  We compiled data on electric lighting in 1950 and stoves in all 
years from the published volumes of the Census of Housing (U.S. Department of Commerce 1943, 





Table 2. Cross-Sectional Regressions of Fertility on Appliances in U.S. Counties, 1940-1960 
 
 Dependent  Variable: 
General Fertility Rate 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 
Panel A: 1940  
    






Observations 3034  3034  3034 
R-squared 0.34  0.50  0.63 
      






Observations 3034  3034  3034 
R-squared 0.31  0.48  0.63 
      
Panel B: 1950       






Observations 3031  3031  3031 
R-squared 0.14  0.39  0.48 
      






Observations 3031  3031  3031 
R-squared 0.07  0.35  0.47 
      
Panel C: 1960       






Observations 3022  3022  3022 
R-squared 0.01  0.29  0.44 
      






Observations 3022  3022  3022 
R-squared 0.02  0.32  0.45 
      
State fixed effects  No  Yes  Yes 
Economic and demographic controls   No  No  Yes 
Notes:  Each point estimate is from a separate regression corresponding to equation 1.  The dependent 
variable is the number of infants (under 1 year) per thousand women ages 15 to 44.  A “modern stove” is 
defined to use electricity or gas (not wood, coal, or kerosene).  The unit of observation is a county.  
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors have been corrected for correlation at the state level and are 
reported in brackets.  The covariates in column 3 include the urban proportion of the county’s population, 
log population density, nonwhite proportion of the county’s population, proportion of employment in 
agriculture and manufacturing (separately), median years of schooling for those over age 24, log of 
median property value, and the proportion of women in the labor force.  The 1950 and 1960 specifications 
also control for log median family income (this variable is unavailable in 1940).  The urban variable 
generally measures the proportion of the population residing in incorporated places with more than 2,500 28 
residents.  The density measure is the log of residents per square mile.  Nonwhite includes black and 
“other” racial categories.  The proportion of workers employed in agricultural and manufacturing 
industries are expressed relative to total employment.  The percent of women in the labor force is the ratio 
of all women in the labor force divided by the number of women over age 14.  The median schooling 
variable in the 1940 table is for women, whereas in 1950 and 1960 it is for both men and women.  
Observations with missing values for any economic or demographic control variable are dropped to 
maintain a consistent sample across specifications.  The inclusion of all counties—rather than just those 
with information for all covariates in each panel— yields similar results.  
 
Sources: Data for refrigerators, washing machines, and covariates are from Haines (2004).  Data on the 
type of cooking fuel, which are used to define “modern stoves,” were entered from the published Census 
of Housing volumes (U.S. Department of Commerce 1943, 1953, 1963). 29 
Table 3. Differenced Regressions of Fertility on Appliances in U.S. Counties, 1940-1960 
 
 Dependent  Variable: 
Change in General Fertility Rate 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 
Panel A: Refrigerators 1940-50 
   






Observations 3023  3023  3023 
R-squared 0.00  0.20  0.28 
 
Panel B: Modern stoves, 1940-60 
   






Observations 2990  2990  2990 
R-squared 0.04  0.29  0.42 
 
Panel C: Modern stoves, 1950-60 
   






Observations 2990  2990  2990 
R-squared 0.04  0.16  0.24 
State fixed effects  No  Yes  Yes 
Economic and demographic controls  No  No  Yes 
 
Notes:  Each point estimate is from a separate regression corresponding to equation 2.  The dependent 
variable is the change in the number of infants (under 1 year) per thousand women ages 15 to 44 between 
two census years at the county-level.  Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors have been corrected for 
correlation at the state level and are reported in brackets.  The covariates in column 3 include the change 
in urban proportion of the county’s population, the change in log population density, the change in 
nonwhite proportion of the county’s population, the change in proportion of employment in agriculture 
and manufacturing (separately), the change in median years of schooling for those over age 24, the 
change in log of median property value, and the change in the proportion of women in the labor force.  
Urban, density, nonwhite, employment and labor force variables are defined as in table 2’s notes.  In this 
table, for better comparability with the variables available in 1950 and 1960 (which include both men and 
women), the schooling variable in 1940 is the average of the median schooling values for men and 
women.  When necessary, observations with missing values are dropped to maintain a consistent sample 
across specifications.  The inclusion of all counties—rather than just those with information for all 
covariates in each panel—yields similar results.  
 
Sources:  Data for refrigerators, washing machines, and covariates are from Haines (2004).  Data on the 
type of cooking fuel were entered from the published census volumes in each year as described in the data 
appendix. 30 
Table 4. Regressions of Period Fertility on Electrical Service, 1940-1950 
 
 Dependent  Variable: 
General Fertility Rate 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 
Panel A: Fertility cross section, 1940 
  






Observations 3034  3034  3034 
R-squared 0.34  0.55  0.64 
 
Panel B: Fertility cross section, 1950 
  






Observations 3031  3031  3031 
R-squared 0.14  0.40  0.48 
 
Panel C: Fertility change, 1940-1950 
  






Observations 3023  3023  3023 
R-squared 0.08  0.24  0.29 
      
State fixed effects  No  Yes  Yes 
Economic and demographic controls  No  No  Yes 
 
Notes and sources:  See table 2.  We compiled the data for electric lights in 1950 from the published 
volumes of the Census of Housing (U.S. Department of Commerce 1953); the 1940 electric light data are 
from Haines (2004). 31 
 
Table 5. Regressions of Children-Ever-Born on Exposure to Electrical Service 
  Dependent Variable: 
Children Ever Born 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Exposure to electricity x 100  -0.008  -0.008  -0.008  -0.008 
  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.002] 
State of birth f.e.  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year of birth f.e.  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Race and education  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Husband’s education  No  No  No  Yes 
Observations  1034  1034  1034  1034 
R-squared  0.877  0.880  0.880  0.881 
 
Notes:  The dependent variable is the mean self-reported children-ever-born to ever married women. 
Observations are birth state-birth year cells.  Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors have been 
corrected for correlation by birth state and are reported in brackets.  The numerator for “mean exposure to 
electricity” in a given state-year cell is constructed from Edison Electrical Institute (EEI) Statistical 
Bulletin which contains annual state-level information on the number of residential electrical customers 
from 1925 to 1960.  In the EEI data, Maryland and Washington DC customers are always counted 
together. North Carolina and South Carolina customers are often counted together.  For consistency we 
have used these larger units of aggregation for all years.  To calculate the denominator, we use the 
housing unit count from the census (interpolated between dates).  “Exposure to electricity” is calculated 
as the mean of this proportion over the peak child-bearing years (15 to 29) for each year-of-birth and birth 
state cohort (and multiplied by 100).  The sample includes women born from 1910 to 1931 (22 cohorts) 
and 47 geographic units for 1034 observations.  
 
Sources: Edison Electric Institute Statistical Bulletin (various years) and 1960-1990 IPUMS (Ruggles et 
al. 2006).   32 
Figure 1. U.S. General Fertility Rate and Children Ever Born from 1895 to 1985 
 
Notes: The outcome variables are the period fertility rate and the mean self-reported number of children 
by birth cohort.  Birth cohorts are indexed to year of birth and increased by 25 years. For instance, the 
birth cohort of 1870 corresponds to the year 1895 on the graph’s horizontal axis.  Computations using the 
IPUMS use population weights. 
 
Sources: Annual fertility rates are calculated using Historical Statistics, 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/statab/t001x01.pdf. The mean number of children ever born per woman is 
calculated using a sample of ever-married women ages 41 to 70 in the 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980 and 1990 
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Figure 2. Proportion of Households with Modern Household Technology, 1890-1970 
 
 
Note: Dashed lines indicate linear interpolation between data points.  
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Source: The nominal wage index for unskilled labor is series Ba4218 and the cost of living series is Cc2 
from Carter et al. (2006), based on David and Solar (1977). 35 
Figure 4. Consumer Durable Prices Relative to Producer Durable Prices, 1982=1 
 
Sources: Gordon (1990) reports quality adjusted price series for consumer durables and producer durables 
starting in 1947 based on Sears Catalogs and Consumer Reports information for specific products.  The 
standard BEA series are not adjusted for quality but are available for a longer period. They are drawn 
























































































































BEA consumer durables/producer durables Gordon's consumer durables/producer durables36 
Figure 5. County-level Correlations between Appliance Ownership and Fertility Rates, 1940-1960 
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Figure 7. Mean Children Born to Likely Amish and Other U.S. Women Born 1860-1954 
 
Notes:  The horizontal axis represents the birth-cohort of the women, which are grouped into five or ten-
year categories to maintain informative samples sizes (see data Appendix for more information).  The 
sample is comprised of ever-married women ages 35 to 85 at the time of observation.  The “Likely Old 
Order Amish” samples consist of women reporting that they speak Pennsylvania Dutch at home; we also 
plot a subsample of this group who do not have phones in their residence in the 1980 and 1990 censuses.  
See text and data appendix for more information.  
 
Source: IPUMS 1940 1% sample; pooled 1980 5%, 1%, 1% Detailed Metro/Nonmetro, 1% Urban/Rural, 
and 1% Labor Market Areas samples; and pooled 1990 5%, 1% Metro, 3% Elderly and 0.5% Labor 
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Likely Old Order Amish (no phones, right axis)Appendix 1. Household and Market Equipment Price Series 
  The information presented here supplements the discussion in section I of the paper, which 
notes that differential trends in price series might reveal evidence of differential trends in sector-
specific technological progress.  In this case, where the pace of improvement in home production 
technology relative to market production technology is of particular interest, one can examine the 
price of equipment used for home production relative to the price of equipment used for market 
production.  We are wary of the problems associated with constructing and interpreting such data 
series over long periods of time, and we describe these concerns in greater detail here for 
completeness.   
  Several issues obscure the interpretation of the price series in the context of our investigation.  
First, the goods-of-interest are likely to have experienced rapid quality gains early in their product 
cycles, and an accurate price series should incorporate adjustments for these quality gains.  Griliches 
(1971) and Gordon (1990) discuss these issues at length.  The standard Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA) price series, and therefore the quantity series that rely on them, do not make such adjustments 
for the period of time and the goods that are important here.  Second, although Gordon (1990) 
provides quality-adjusted price information for the post-1947 period, there is little quality-adjusted 
information for earlier years.  Third, important early improvements in household production, such as 
running water and canned goods, are not incorporated in durable good or appliance price series.  
Fourth, capital goods are inputs to household and market production; their prices are not measures of 
home or market productivity per se.  
  With these caveats in mind, if one takes the BEA price series at face value, it appears that the 
price of consumer durables, expressed relative to the price of private investment in equipment, 
increased sharply in the early 1940s and then gradually declined (appendix figure 1.1).  It was not 
until 1955 that the relative price returned to its 1940 level, by which time the baby boom had nearly 
peaked.  If we focus on the household appliance subset of consumer durables, it appears that from 
1929 (when the series starts) to 1941 the series declines, then there was a sharp increase during the 
war, and a resumption of the pre-existing trend downward after the war.  By 1950, the relative price 
had returned to its level in 1940, but in the meantime the fertility rate had increased from 80 to 106 
(compared to 118 in 1960).  Both relative price series from the BEA suggest that the baby boom was 
launched during a period of relatively high prices for equipment used in home production.
1  
                                                   
1 Data are drawn from Table 1.6.4. Price Series for Gross Domestic Purchases and Table 2.4.4. Price Indexes for 
Personal Consumption Expenditures by Type of Product, from the BEA website: 
http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/Index.asp.     Gordon (1990) shows that adjusting the prices of durable goods for changes in quality can 
make a large difference in the post-war price trends.  This implies that the failure to incorporate 
quality adjustments in the BEA series can lead to large biases over long periods of time, and the 
biases need not be similar in the price series for different goods, so they would not simply difference 
out in a relative series.  According to Gordon’s series, there was no decline in the relative price of 
consumer durables from the late 1940s onward (appendix figure 1.2).  There was, however, a notable 
decline in the relative prices of specific household appliances, with considerable variation depending 
on the appliance and adjustments for energy efficiency.
2  Because the series start in the late 1940s, it 
is impossible to infer whether the relative price declines reflect a return to a pre-existing trend after a 
wartime price shock (as suggested by the BEA appliance price series), accelerating productivity in 
the production of household equipment, or neither.  Moreover, it is difficult to put the quality-
adjusted decline for any specific appliance into quantitative perspective without having a longer and 
broader set of historical examples.
3   
  It is apparent that improvements to the price series could have serious implications for 
macroeconomic studies that rely on long time series of national accounts data.  Rather than attempt to 
resolve those issues in this paper, we go on (in section II of the paper) to provide direct analyses of 
the correlations between actual appliance diffusion and fertility rates from 1940 to 1960.  The 
analyses directly assess whether there is a positive link between the spread of new household 
technologies and the baby boom. 
                                                   
2 The numerator of the washing machine plot is based on the Consumer Reports series (Gordon 1990, column 5 of 
table 7.12), which has a larger decline than the series based on Sears catalogs.  The denominator is the producer 
durable equipment deflator (Gordon 1990: 541).   
3 Assessing pre-war innovations of great value, such as running water and electric irons, would be important in this 
regard, as would be incorporating quality improvements in stoves, ranges, refrigerators and iceboxes. Appendix Figure 1.1. Relative Price of Consumer Durables, 
BEA Price Indexes, 1982=1 
 
 
Appendix Figure 1.2. Quality-Adjusted Relative Price of Consumer Durables,  
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Consumer durables/producer durablesAppendix 2. Data Sources 
County-level data 
  Data for infants per woman aged 15 to 44 and for the proportions of homes with lights (in 
1940), refrigerators (in 1940 and 1950), and washing machines (1960) are from the files compiled by 
Michael Haines (2004).  Specifically, files “32: 1940 Census I”, “33: 1940 Census II”, and “70: 1947 
County Data Book” provide demographic and economic data for 1940.  Files “35: 1950 Census I”, 
“36: 1950 Census II”, “72: 1952 County Data Book” and “73: 1956 County Data Book” provide data 
for 1950.  Files “39: 1960 Census II”, “40: 1960 Census III”, “74: 1962 County Data Book”, and 
“75: 1967 County Data Book” provide data for 1960.  In 1950 and 1960 the housing appliance data 
are based on subsamples of the full population. 
  We typed in the data for electric lights in 1950 and for cooking fuel in 1940, 1950, and 1960 
from the published volumes of the Census of Housing, and combined that information with the data 
from Haines (2004) described above.  For 1940, the cooking fuel figures are from Volume 2, Table 
23 (for each state) of the Census of Housing.  For 1950, the lighting and cooking fuel figures are 
from Volume 1, Table 27 (for each state) of the Census of Housing.  For 1960, the cooking fuel 
figures are from Volume 1, Tables 16 and 29 of the Census of Housing.   
  The proportion of homes with “modern stoves” is the ratio of the number using electricity, 
utility gas, or bottled gas for the principal cooking fuel divided by the total number of units that 
report the cooking fuel variable; implicitly, we define those using wood, coal, kerosene, “other”, or 
no fuel as “not modern.”  The “mechanical refrigerator” variable pertains to any type of refrigeration 
equipment powered by electricity, gas, kerosene, or gasoline; this is distinct from an “ice box.”  The 
“washing machine” variable that is reported in the Haines files for 1960 includes “automatic and 
semi-automatic” washing machines that wash, rinse, and damp dry the laundry; “washer-dryer 
combination” machines that wash, rinse, and fully dry the clothes in the same tub; and power-
operated “wringer or spinner” machines.   
  We made the following adjustments to the data from Haines (2004):  
  1. In 1940, the proportion of housing units with refrigerators in Raleigh County, West 
Virginia should be 41.8 percent, and the proportion in Washington, DC should be 79.1 percent.  The 
median years of schooling for women and men in Cooke County, Texas should be 8.9 and 8.3 
respectively.  The county code for Warwick, Virginia is adjusted in 1940 to facilitate merger across 
datasets.   
  2. In 1950, approximately 40 counties with missing values for refrigerators in the 1952 
County Data Book (underlying the Haines data) are listed as zeros in the Haines files.  We referred 
back to the original Census volumes to fill in the correct figures when possible, or to set the value to “missing” if unavailable in the Census (replacing zero).  Separately, the proportion of housing units 
with refrigerators in Washington, DC should be 92.0.  In 1960, the figure for washing machines in 
Lee County, Kentucky should be 73.2 percent according to the 1962 County and City Data Book.  
The median property value in Milam County, Texas should be $5,400. 
  Matching counties over time is imperfect due to occasional mergers and changes in 
boundaries.  Partial county entries for Yellowstone National Park are dropped from the analysis, as 
are counties/territories in Hawaii and Alaska. Excluding counties with reported changes of more than 
5 square miles does not change the qualitative results from tables 3 and 4.  The coefficient in panel 
A, column 3 (refrigerators, 1940-50) increases in magnitude from -0.101 (s.e.=0.094) to -0.121 
(s.e.=0.091); the coefficient in panel B, column 3 (stoves 1940-1960) falls in magnitude from -0.088 
(s.e.=0.049) to -0.076 (s.e.=0.051).  The coefficient change for electric lighting (1940-50) in table 4 
is from -0.182 to -0.187 (s.e.=0.054 in both cases). 
  In 1960, approximately 15 percent of counties have a bottom code for median property 
values of $5,000 in the census data.  The results in the text are not sensitive to resetting these 
observations to $3,750 (75% of 5,000).  In table 2, panel C, column 3, the coefficient on washing 
machines falls from 0.068 to 0.057 (s.e.=0.069 in both cases); the coefficient on modern stoves falls 
from -0.309 (s.e.=0.113) to -0.327 (s.e.=0.116).  In table 3, panel B, column 3, the coefficient on 
modern stoves (1940-60) falls from -0.088 to -0.093 (s.e. = 0.50 in both cases); in panel C, column 3, 
the coefficient on modern stoves (1950-60) increases from -0.044 to -0.043 (s.e. = 0.053 in both 
cases).   
 
State-level, annual electricity data 
  The numerator for the “mean exposure to electricity” variable is constructed from the Edison 
Electrical Institute (EEI) publication, Statistical Bulletin.  The Bulletin provides annual state-level 
reports of the number of residential electrical customers from 1925 to 1960.  In the EEI data, 
Maryland and Washington DC customers are always counted together. North Carolina and South 
Carolina customers are often counted together, and for consistency we used these larger units of 
aggregation for all years.   
  To calculate the denominator, we used the housing unit counts from the census, which we 
interpolated between dates with constant growth rates.  Then, we divided the EEI customer counts by 
the Census of Housing counts of families (in 1920 and 1930) or occupied dwelling units (in 1940, 
1950, and 1960) in each state to estimate the proportion of families with electrical service.  The 
figures for the denominator are consistent with the housing unit counts in Historical Statistics of the 
United States (Carter et al., 2006).  Kenneth Snowden discusses the comparability of housing count data across census years in Volume 4 of Historical Statistics ( 4-500 and 4-501): “Before 1940 the 
census enumerated “families” and not housing unit… However, the two concepts are closely related: 
a census family was defined in 1930 as a single person living alone, a small group of unrelated 
persons sharing living accommodations, or, more normally, a group of related persons who live 
together as one household.  Despite differences in terminology, therefore, the basic notion of a 
family, dwelling unit, or housing unit has provided essentially comparable measures of the residential 
housing stock since 1890.” 
  On occasion, the ratio of residential customers from EEI to housing units from the Census 
slightly exceeds unity (in approximately 10 percent of state-year cells from 1925 to 1960).  Nearly all 
such cases (84 percent) occur between 1950 and 1960 when the true rate of electrification is likely to 
be close to 100 percent for some states.  We have left these values in place rather than making ad hoc 
adjustments to the underlying data. 
 
Amish data 
  The Amish fertility series presented in the text combine information from several different 
IPUMS samples to maximize sample size.  This combined sample includes the 1940 1% sample; 
pooled 1980 5%, 1%, 1% Detailed Metro/Nonmetro, 1% Urban/Rural, and 1% Labor Market Areas 
samples; and pooled 1990 5%, 1% Metro, 3% Elderly and 0.5% Labor Market Areas samples of the 
U.S. decennial census (Ruggles et al. 2009).  For comparison groups we select non-Pennsylvania 
Dutch speaking respondents from farms in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Indiana (the main settlement 
areas of the Amish) and a set of non-farm households from throughout the US (to show the general 
population’s baby boom).  As described in the main text, we check the robustness of trends by 
excluding respondents with telephones in the 1980 and 1990 censuses and also excluding 
Pennsylvania Dutch speakers residing in Pennsylvania.  Appendix table 2.1 reports the estimates and 
sample sizes underlying figure 7.   
  The main criterion for selection into the sample of potential Amish respondents is whether 
Pennsylvania Dutch is the respondent’s primary language spoken at home (1980 and 1990) or 
“mother tongue” (1940 census).  There is a close link between Amish-status and the use of 
Pennsylvania Dutch (also known as Pennsylvania German) as one’s primary language.  This claim is 
based upon several external sources.   
i.  We contacted a contributor to the linguistics literature on the Pennsylvania German language, 
Karen Johnson-Weiner, a Professor of Anthropology at SUNY-Potsdam.  She confirmed that 
the overwhelming majority of Pennsylvania German speakers, the term used by linguists to 
refer to Pennsylvania Dutch speakers, are Old Order Amish or from smaller groups of conservative “horse-and-buggy” Old Order Mennonites [specifically the Stauffer and Wenger 
Mennonite groups].  The most easily and widely accessible source of reliable information on 
the Amish is Elizabethtown College’s Amish Studies website, which is supported by the 
Young Center for Anabaptist and Pietist Studies.  As of May 2010, the website notes that 
“Regardless of where they live, the Amish speak the Pennsylvania German dialect (popularly 
known as Pennsylvania Dutch), except in a few communities where they speak a Swiss 
Dialect” (http://www2.etown.edu/amishstudies/FAQ.asp).   It also notes that “Although the 
Amish originally comprised only a small minority of the Pennsylvania German-speaking 
population [in the 1700s], they and the Old Order Mennonites are the last groups to use the 
language actively and pass it on to their children” 
(http://www2.etown.edu/amishstudies/Language.asp).  Our reading suggests that when 
scholars attempt to estimate the number of Pennsylvania Dutch speakers in the world, they 
start by estimating the number of Old Order Amish; other groups are comparatively small.  In 
sum, there is no controversy in the claim that Pennsylvania Dutch is the primary language of 
the Amish, and that the Amish comprise the vast majority of speakers of Pennsylvania Dutch.   
ii.  We also undertook additional reading of the linguistics literature on Pennsylvania German.  
Huffines (1980) notes: “Pennsylvania German is the main language used within plain 
families and communities, the language which is passed on to children as their mother 
tongue” and “The use of Pennsylvania German among non-plain Pennsylvania Germans is 
diminishing rapidly.  Most of the non-plain Pennsylvania Germans learn Pennsylvania 
German as a second language if they learn it at all” (p. 352).
4  Moelleken notes, “From all 
accounts the cluster speakers have already assumed the dominant role in the Pennsylvania 
German-speaking landscape and will, in all likelihood, all but displace the other groups in a 
few years” (1988, p. 107).
5  Overall, our reading suggests a rapid decline in the use of 
Pennsylvania German among non-Amish residents of Pennsylvania starting in the early 
1900s at the latest.  Like many other ethnic groups in the early 1900s, non-Amish adult 
speakers of Pennsylvania Dutch stopped speaking and teaching the language to their children 
(who attended English-speaking schools) because of perceptions about the importance of 
learning and using English.  This may have been heightened by anti-German sentiment 
associated with World War I and II.  Daily and primary use of the language has all but died in 
non-Amish communities, and even among those non-Amish who have rudimentary 
                                                   
4 In this context, “plain” families are members of conservative, Old Order sects of Amish and Mennonites.  
5 “Cluster speakers” of Pennsylvania Dutch are those apart from mainstream society due to their religious beliefs.  
The Amish are the largest such group. knowledge of the Pennsylvania Dutch language, nearly all view English as their first 
language.   
 
  We find the information above to be helpful in confirming our interpretation of the 
Pennsylvania Dutch language variable as a strong correlate of Old Order Amish religion, but we have 
pursued an additional robustness check: Suppose that non-Amish Pennsylvania Dutch speakers 
contaminate our sample.  To the extent that non-Amish Pennsylvania Dutch speakers are in our 
sample, nearly all should reside in Pennsylvania.  Therefore, we constructed an IPUMS-based series 
that excludes everyone from Pennsylvania.  Appendix figure 2.1 shows that this restriction does not 
change our conclusions.  This robustness check squares nicely with other checks reported in the 
paper.   
  Finally, it is worth noting that our work with the IPUMS data offers confirmation of facts that 
were originally generated in a completely independent literature on the demographic history of 
Amish—a literature that uses genealogical records in which there is no ambiguity about Amish 
status.  This literature is discussed and cited in section III of the paper. 












1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960
Likely Old Order Amish (no PA) Likely Old Order Amish
Likely Old Order Amish (no phone) IN, OH, PA FarmersAppendix Table 2.1. Summary Statistics for the Likely Old Order Amish Sample 
Birth 
Cohort  Likely Amish  Likely Amish 
(no phones) 
Farm residents in 
IN, OH, PA 
Non-farm U.S. 
residents 
1860  3.96  3.66  3.38 
  (0.513)  (0.236)  (0.038) 
  [23]   [141]  [6,204] 
1870  2.686   3.14  2.89 
  (0.490)  (0.143)  (0.025) 
  [35]   [331]  [12,410] 
1880  3.121   2.79  2.42 
  (0.464)   (0.12)  (0.019) 
  [33]   [471]  [15,878] 
1890  2.721 4.680*  2.88  2.39 
  (0.261) (0.554) (0.093) (0.007) 
  [104] [50] [704]  [120,368] 
1900  3.072   2.52  2.25 
  (0.141)  (0.054)  (0.003) 
  [426]   [1,622]  [536,506] 
1910  3.238 5.314  2.80  2.38 
  (0.107) (0.385) (0.038) (0.002) 
  [769] [105]  [3,186]  [1,078,488] 
1920  3.458 6.098*  3.16  2.71 
  (0.169) (0.36) (0.045)  (0.003) 
  [365] [132]  [2,292]  [686,069] 
1925  4.013   3.36  2.96 
  (0.167)  (0.044)  (0.003) 
  [377]   [2,451]  [707,994] 
1930  3.308 6.005*  3.55  3.12 
  (0.189) (0.281) (0.044) (0.003) 
  [318] [187]  [2,376]  [671,161] 
1935  4.363   3.36  2.98 
  (0.192)   (0.04)  (0.002) 
  [300]   [2,314]  [683,298] 
1940  4.542 6.216  2.95  2.54 
  (0.188) (0.324) (0.037) (0.002) 
  [332] [139]  [2,381]  [815,073] 
1945  4.419 6.614  2.53  2.16 
  (0.240) (0.435) (0.046) (0.002) 
  [210] [70]  [1,303]  [591,659] 
1950  4.283 5.609  2.52  1.93 
  (0.229) (0.361) (0.055) (0.002) 
  [205] [92]  [1,067]  [585,480] 
Total  3.757 5.888 3.033 2.567 
  (0.054) (0.139) (0.015) (0.001) 
  [3,497] [775]  [20,639]  [6,510,588]  
Notes:  The table entries are the mean number of children ever born, the standard error of the mean in 
parenthesis, and the number of observations in brackets.  Birth cohorts are grouped into five or ten-
year categories to maintain informative samples sizes. *The cohort labeled 1890-99 for the likely Old 
Amish (no phones) corresponds to the 1890 to 1909 cohort.  The younger cohorts of the likely Amish 
(no phones) are grouped into ten year cohorts, so the cohorts labeled 1920-24 and 1930-34 
correspond to the ten-year groupings 1920-29 and 1930-39, respectively. For sample definitions and 
source information, see text and figure 7 notes.  
 
  Appendix 3. Additional Results 
 
  This appendix reports additional results from regressions of county-level fertility rates on 
appliance ownership and electrification.     
Median regressions 
  Footnote 8 of the paper reports that median regressions yield results that are similar to those 
from the paper’s OLS regression specifications, which are reported in tables 2, 3, and 4.  For 
comparison, the median regression results are reported in appendix tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 presented 
below.     
Instrumental variable regressions 
  Because access to the electrical service is related to the use of modern appliances, it is a 
potential instrumental variable for appliance ownership.  At the request of a referee, we ran 
regressions of fertility on appliances (refrigerators or modern stoves), using electricity in 1940 and 
1950 as an instrumental variable.  This yields uniformly negative coefficients on appliance diffusion.  
Results are reported in appendix table 3.4 below.  Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the 
state level and reported in square brackets.  F-statistics on the excluded instrument from the first-
stage regression are reported in curved brackets.  In some cases the IV results are close to the OLS 
results in tables 2 and 3 of the paper, but in other cases the IV results are much larger in magnitude 
(i.e., much more negative).  We are not fully convinced that this is a valid IV strategy because it is 
hard to rule out the possibility that electrification had a direct effect on fertility through its effect on 
the local economy.   
Additional control variables 
  To address concerns about cross-county differences in the distribution of income across 
families, we have re-run the paper’s county-level regressions with additional control variables that 
measure the proportions of families with “low” and “high” income.  The 1950 census reports the 
proportion of families with income under $2,000 and proportion of families with income above 
$5,000 in each county.  The 1960 census reports the proportion of families below $3,000 and the 
proportion above $10,000.  Regression results are reported in appendix table 3.5 for both the original 
specification (as in the paper) and the expanded specification (with low and high income).  Adding 
these variables has a negligible effect on the results.  There is not comparable information for the 
1940 census, which did not ascertain family income or its distribution.     Appendix Table 3.1. Quantile Regressions of Fertility on Appliances in U.S. Counties, 
Cross-Sectional Specifications, 1940-1960 
 
 Dependent  Variable: 
General Fertility Rate 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 
Panel A: 1940  
    









Observations 3034  3034  3034 
Pseudo R-squared  0.21  0.32  0.42 
      









Observations 3034  3034  3034 
Pseudo R-squared  0.18  0.31  0.42 
      
Panel B: 1950       









Observations 3031  3031  3031 
Pseudo R-squared  0.07  0.24  0.31 
      









Observations 3031  3031  3031 
Pseudo R-squared  0.03  0.21  0.30 
      
Panel C: 1960       









Observations 3022  3022  3022 
Pseudo R-squared  0.001  0.17  0.28 
      









Observations 3022  3022  3022 
Pseudo R-squared  0.004  0.19  0.28 
      
State fixed effects  No  Yes  Yes 
Economic and demographic controls   No  No  Yes 
 
Notes:  Each point estimate is from a separate median regression corresponding to equation 1 (cross-
sectional specification).  Stata’s default method for calculating standard errors is based on Koenker 
and Bassett (1992) and Rogers (1993); these are reported in square brackets.  Bootstrapped standard errors (1,000 repetitions) are reported in curved brackets; the method is based on Gould (1992, 
1997).  The dependent variable is the number of infants (under 1 year) per thousand women ages 15 
to 44.  A “modern stove” is defined to use electricity or gas (not wood, coal, or kerosene).  The unit 
of observation is a county.  The covariates in column 3 include the urban proportion of the county’s 
population, log population density, nonwhite proportion of the county’s population, proportion of 
employment in agriculture and manufacturing (separately), median years of schooling for those over 
age 24, log of median property value, and the proportion of women in the labor force.  The 1950 and 
1960 specifications also control for log median family income (this variable is unavailable in 1940).  
The urban variable generally measures the proportion of the population residing in incorporated 
places with more than 2,500 residents.  The density measure is the log of residents per square mile.  
Nonwhite includes black and “other” racial categories.  The proportion of workers employed in 
agricultural and manufacturing industries are expressed relative to total employment.  The percent of 
women in the labor force is the ratio of all women in the labor force divided by the number of 
women over age 14.  The median schooling variable in the 1940 table is for women, whereas in 1950 
and 1960 it is for both men and women.  Observations with missing values for any economic or 
demographic control variable are dropped to maintain a consistent sample across specifications.   
 
Sources: Data for refrigerators, washing machines, and covariates are from Haines (2004).  Data on 
the type of cooking fuel, which are used to define “modern stoves,” were entered from the published 
Census of Housing volumes (U.S. Department of Commerce 1943, 1953, 1963). Appendix Table 3.2. Quantile Regressions of Fertility on Appliances in U.S. Counties,  
Difference Specifications, 1940-1960 
 
 Dependent  Variable: 
Change in General Fertility Rate 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 
Panel A: Refrigerators 1940-50 
   









Observations 3023  3023  3023 
Pseudo R-squared  0.00  0.12  0.18 
 
Panel B: Modern stoves, 1940-60 
   









Observations 2990  2990  2990 
Pseudo R-squared  0.04  0.18  0.26 
 
Panel C: Modern stoves, 1950-60 
   









Observations 2990  2990  2990 
Pseudo R-squared  0.03  0.11  0.15 
State fixed effects  No  Yes  Yes 
Economic and demographic controls  No  No  Yes 
 
Notes:  Each point estimate is from a separate median regression corresponding to equation 2 
(difference specification).  Stata’s default method for calculating standard errors is based on Koenker 
and Bassett (1992) and Rogers (1993); these are reported in square brackets.  Bootstrapped standard 
errors (1,000 repetitions) are reported in curved brackets; the method is based on Gould (1992, 
1997).  The dependent variable is the change in the number of infants (under 1 year) per thousand 
women ages 15 to 44 between two census years at the county-level.  The covariates in column 3 
include the change in urban proportion of the county’s population, the change in log population 
density, the change in nonwhite proportion of the county’s population, the change in proportion of 
employment in agriculture and manufacturing (separately), the change in median years of schooling 
for those over age 24, the change in log of median property value, and the change in the proportion of 
women in the labor force.  Urban, density, nonwhite, employment and labor force variables are 
defined as in table 2’s notes.  In this table, for better comparability with the variables available in 
1950 and 1960 (which include both men and women), the schooling variable in 1940 is the average 
of the median schooling values for men and women.  When necessary, observations with missing 
values are dropped to maintain a consistent sample across specifications.   
 
Sources:  Data for refrigerators, washing machines, and covariates are from Haines (2004).  Data on 
the type of cooking fuel were entered from the published census volumes in each year as described in 
the data appendix. Appendix Table 3.3. Quantile Regressions of Period Fertility on Electrical Service, 1940-1950 
 
 Dependent  Variable: 
General Fertility Rate 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 
Panel A: Fertility cross section, 1940 
  









Observations 3034  3034  3034 
Pseudo R-squared  0.21  0.36  0.42 
 
Panel B: Fertility cross section, 1950 
  









Observations 3031  3031  3031 
Pseudo R-squared  0.07  0.25  0.31 
 
Panel C: Fertility change, 1940-1950 
  









Observations 3023  3023  3023 
Pseudo R-squared  0.05  0.15  0.18 
      
State fixed effects  No  Yes  Yes 
Economic and demographic controls  No  No  Yes 
 
Notes and sources:  See appendix table 3.1.  We compiled the data for electric lights in 1950 from the 
published volumes of the Census of Housing (U.S. Department of Commerce 1953); the 1940 electric 




 Appendix Table 3.4. Using Electric Lights to IV for Appliance Ownership in 1940 and 1950 
 
Panel A: Cross Section 
Regressions, 
Corresponding 

















































































Panel B: Difference 
Regressions,  
Corresponding 


































State fixed effects  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Control  variables  No No No No Yes  Yes 
Notes: The table reports both OLS and IV regressions of fertility on appliance ownership, corresponding 
to tables 2 and 3 in the paper.  Robust standard errors are clustered by state and reported in square 
brackets.  In the IV columns, the first-stage regression’s F-statistic on the excluded instrument (proportion 
of households with electrical lights) is reported in curved brackets.  The 1960 census did not inquire about 
electric lights, so the IV approach cannot be attempted for that year.   
 Appendix Table 3.5. Regressions with Controls for Proportions of Families with “Low” and 
“High” Income, 1950 and 1960 
 
 Original  coefficients 
and standard errors 
from “column 3” of 
relevant table and panel 
After adding 
controls for families 
with “low” and 
“high” income 





















Notes and sources: See tables 2 and 4 of the paper. Additional References 
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